Jose Mourinho’s starting lineup definitely puzzled the analysts on NBC(and a few people on Twitter). Based on the starting lineup that he put out one would expect Spurs to have fielded a back three composed of Tanganga, Alderweireld and Sanchez flanked by Danny Rose on the left and Aurier on the right. In their defense, our friendly NBC analysts weren’t too far off the mark. As the match progressed one could easily discern that Spurs defended with two banks of four in a 4-4-2. Serge Aurier became the right midfielder while Rose dropped deeper at left back. When in possession the formation would flex into a lopsided a 5-3-2. Tottenham avoided the many pitfalls of defending with a back 3 by playing a back 4 instead. This did come at the cost of offensive cohesion.

I was pleasantly surprised by the fact Spurs really did come to play. I was fully expecting Mourinho to park the bus but it was clear that they had a game plan. Mourinho laid out a side optimally positioned to execute the perfect smash and grab but were hampered by their inability to finish in front of goal. The pace and trickery of Son and Moura proved especially troubling for Liverpool’s center back pair. Defensively Spurs set up in a medium block with the two strikers(Son and Moura) positioned to prevent passes from the center backs into Liverpool’s midfielders. Consequently Liverpool’s advances up the field had to be done via the flanks.

Lucas Moura was the right sided Spurs striker and he tucked in extremely narrow. As a result of this Serge Aurier was responsible, offensively and defensively, for the entirety of Spurs right flank. This proved somewhat problematic towards the end of the match as he began to tire. Spurs shape more frequently resembled a back five as he spent less time upfield. This was particularly detrimental when Mourinho changed shape later in the match. When seen solely from the tactics board Mourinho’s choice to go with a 3-5-2 on the attack was somewhat sound. It achieved numerical advantage in the middle of the park and push up Spurs wingbacks to combat Liverpool’s marauding wingbacks. The only downside is that the Spurs center backs did not have any cover whenever the ball turned over. In practice Liverpool’s gegenpressing was extremely troublesome and Spurs were unable to establish consistent patterns of play. Their best chances came from quick counter attacks driven by individual player skill

Liverpool looked extremely off the pace for this game. It was a fairly languid performance from them. They dominated the match in terms of possession( 67% to 33%) but were unable to create decisive chances. The ephemeral positioning of Roberto Firmino was their key differentiator in this match. I’ll repeat this but I suspect it is unnecessary: common footballing wisdom states that 3 at the back is most effective when the opposition field two strikers(say it again for the folks in the back). The twin defensive pitfalls of fielding 3 at the back can be seen as two different sides of a most painful coin.

On the one side if the opposition play with 3 attackers then each center back is on their own and without cover. On the other side if the opposition field only a sole striker then you have 3 defenders marking one player leaving you shorthanded elsewhere on the field. By flitting about as a false 9 Firmino expertly exposed the former and exacerbated the latter. Whenever he was positioned up the field he occupied Tottenham’s defensive trio(or duo depending on how quickly they were caught out of position). If instead he chose to drop deep then a majority of Spur’s backline were marking empty space.

The second half bore a startling resemblance to the first. Fresh from the break Spurs started off rather sprightly on the counter attack and very compact on defense. But as the half wore on Liverpool steadily began asserting more control on the match. The pattern of play swung tremendously in Spurs favor when Mourinho introduced Lo Celso and Lamela for Rose and Erikson in the 68th minute. Their ensuing shape strongly resembled a 4-3-3. They immediately became much more coherent when in possession and their chances were forged via fluid passing interchanges as opposed to sheer individual skill. I was somewhat surprised by the inability of Spur’s fullbacks to get forward on the overlap. As I alluded to earlier, Aurier was responsible for Spurs entire right flank so this can largely be attributed to fatigue on his part. A fitting explanation for Spurs left back proves a little more elusive.

I can’t help but feel slightly disappointed by this match from a tactical perspective. It merely confirmed what one can easily decipher by staring at the tactics board. There were no pivotal individual battles or overarching tactical master strokes. All in all it was a fairly pedestrian affair with a solitary goal that was completely disjointed from the entire flow of the match.

Tottenham Liverpool English Premier League